Wednesday 28 March 2018

Shot Down and in the Drink//Shot Down and on the Run - Graham Pitchfork

Title: Shot Down and in the Drink//Shot Down and on the Run
Author: Graham Pitchfork
ISBN: 978-1-4728-2727-2//978-1-4728-2727-7
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2017
Softcover
Pages: 276/258
Photos/ Maps: 40/33
One of the more unique aspects of wartime is the nature of the predicaments that aircrew find themselves in following a crash or enemy engagement. In modern times we have the benefits of GPS, electronic locator beacons (ELT’s), specialized immersion suits, radios and cell phones. None of these were available during the Second World War and, given the relative infancy of air travel (keep in mind that aircraft had only been in operation in larger numbers following the end of the First World War) not a lot of policy or doctrine had been developed for search and rescue. Pitchfork has, in his two books, looked at very similar predicaments but also very diverse environments that aircrew found themselves and what had been developed, often with the benefit of experience rather than determined planning, to deal with their challenges.

For any mariner or aircrew that has been sunk, crashed or shot down, being in the water has to be one of the most terrifying experiences imaginable. With little or no means of contact, not knowing if anyone is even aware that you are down, no access to fresh water or food, subject to the ravages of heat and cold, seasick and possibly wounded, the future surely seemed bleak at best. Pitchfork outlines the ways in which the Allies tried to overcome these challenges through the use of a robust LifeBoat (RLNI) and an Air-Sea Rescue organization, specialized aircraft such as the PBY and the Walrus and recovery equipment such as the rubberized dinghy. He also relates the activation of a unit, MI9, responsible to all aspects of doctrine and coordination related to water borne recovery. The author then goes on to relate the efforts made in the different theatres of war (ie Pacific and Mediterranean) and the unique challenges that each presented. Additionally he relates in detail the experiences of the aircrew themselves (including one story involving a pigeon). It is very safe to say that training, preparation and a healthy piece of luck played a huge role in the recovery of these individuals; they all more than earned inclusion in the prestigious ‘Goldfish’ club.

His second book in this series, Shot Down and on the Run, outlines the involvement of MI9, the agency responsible for the training, debriefing and the coordination of the return of downed aircrew not only on the Continent but internationally. The complexity of this undertaking is clearly related in this work. Not only were combatant nations involved but neutral countries such as Spain and Sweden had to be engaged. It is of note the variety of support the Allies received from these nations. Additionally, the nature of the rescue varied heavily from region to region as rescuers as diverse as Russian partisans, Serbian fighters, Senussi Arabs and Pacific Coast Watchers. MI9 was the lead agency tasked with developing the structure and training required for those finding themselves in enemy territory. The nature of this training was completely different from water borne rescue and served not only as a source of knowledge for those on the run but also for the Allied intelligence agencies able to debrief these individuals upon their return.

Pitchforks books are engaging and fascinating reads. They represent a comprehensive rendition of the breadth and scope of the responsibilities of the organizations (specifically MI9) tasked with finding and rescuing these downed airmen. I was a little surprised that the issue of Ferry Command (that agency responsible for transporting aircraft from North America to the UK and Pacific) was not addressed. Certainly they represented a unique challenge given the distance and environment in which they operated. Nevertheless, an excellent set of books and well worth the time and expense.

Friday 23 March 2018

War in the East: A Military History of the Russo-Turkish War 1877-78 - Quintin Barry

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine.


Title: War in the East: A Military History of the Russo-Turkish War 1877-78
Author: Quintin Barry
ISBN: 978-1-911096-69-6
Publisher: Helion
Year: 2016
Softcover
Pages: 534
Photos/ Maps: 100’s/17

Barry has once again focussed his attention on a war of less prominence internationally but one that had very significant implications for the region in which it took place. The Ottoman Empire at the time of the conflict encompassed the European regions of Bulgaria, portions of modern day Romania and areas of Bosnia. The Russians were very much interested in extending their access and influence to encompass not only the Black Sea but also were seeking passage to the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles. The Ottomans were, even at this time, seen as the weak man of Europe, heavily corrupt and vulnerable to collapse; the Russians, following the brutal suppression of a Bulgarian uprising by the Turks, saw an opportunity to break their neighbour to the south and extend their influence regionally.

What looked to be a simple operation that would result in Russian victory and accompanying international prestige turned into a difficult, costly and grinding campaign that was far more challenging than anyone had originally anticipated. While the Russians achieved complete victory in the end, it was as much a result of Turkish incompetence as Russian capability. It also came very close to resulting in war between Russia and Great Britain due to the concerns about Russian interest in the Dardanelles. Barry presents a very accurate and telling view of the international pressure brought to bear upon both protagonists as the European community sought to protect their own interests and limit the reach of Russia.

Barry has done a noteworthy analysis of this war. He succinctly encompasses the international as well as the operational components of the war; he also clearly highlights where opportunities were lost to both sides. For example his discussion of the Turkish Black Sea fleet and the Danube gunboat squadrons are indicative of the lack of operational appreciation shown by the Turkish commanders. The book represents a strategic/operational analysis of the conflict in that he only periodically dips into the tactical stories of the soldiers themselves. It is enough however, to gain a good appreciation of the conditions and environment under which the conflict was fought. Of particular note was Barry’s discussion of the extensive use of fortifications and the power of the defensive war compared to the offensive. The use of trenches and hard points by the Turks gave a hint of the nature of war to come, lessons that were not readily grasped by the observers.

I was very disappointed with the maps provided as I found the actions in the narrative difficult to follow on them. Beyond that the book is very well written and the photo’s/drawings provide very good context to the narrative. Barry closes his book with an excellent synopsis of the forces involved as well as a comprehensive bibliography. An engaging read and study of the last major conflict of the 1800’s.

Confronting Case Blue: Briansk Front’s Attempt to Derail the German Drive to the Caucasus, July 1942 - Igor’ Sdvizhkov

This review has been submitted to War History Online.


Title: Confronting Case Blue: Briansk Front’s Attempt to Derail the German Drive to the Caucasus, July 1942
Author: Igor’ Sdvizhkov
ISBN: 978-1-911096-43-6
Publisher: Helion
Year: 2016
Hardcover
Pages: 420
Photos/Maps: 9/8

During the summer of 1942, the Germans were well into their drive to the Caucasus and the capture of vast areas of the southern Soviet Union. The Soviets, desperate to try and blunt the German efforts, launched a series of spoiling attacks into the flanks of the stretched German Forces. The author has analyzed one of the more significant of those attacks with a view to shedding light on the strengths and weaknesses of the adversaries at this point in the war. His perspective is primarily from the Soviet side and he is brutally honest in his evaluations of the leadership and C2 (command and control) of the Soviet and German forces.

The author breaks down his analysis into chapters representing days as well as sides. Thus he will present a synopsis of the Russian actions on July 25th in one chapter followed in the next chapter by an analysis of the German actions over the same period. His extensive use of primary source material makes it very interesting for the reader to note how the adversaries were interpreting each other’s actions. This method also provides for an outstanding comparison between the command and control methodologies of the two sides.

The Germans by this point on the war were acknowledging that some Russian equipment (specifically the T-34) was superior in both quality and quantity to the front line German tanks. Additionally, Russian manpower reserves were beginning to make themselves felt; however, the Germans still had a clear advantage in combined/joint warfare capability (especially regarding the use of airpower) and in their combat and support leadership. The author relates numerous examples of opportunities that the Russians squandered as a result of their leadership (focussing primarily on Major and above) failing to make decisions or assuming control with the loss of a commander. Conversely, German leadership proves itself to be dynamic, proactive and engaged. Senior commanders are at the front assessing situations and providing guidance and direction as required. The soldiers on both sides are brave but it is the leadership that makes a telling difference in this campaign.

It is also fascinating to see the degree to which the political arm of the Soviet military takes precedence and exerts influence upon operations. Reports quoted by the author repeatedly speak in ‘Bolshevik’ and draw attention to the failings of leaders within a political vice a tactical or operational context. It speaks volumes as to why there was a dearth of initiative within the Russian leadership. Additionally, the author draws attention to the experience and educational background of the key Russian commanders. The instability of the interwar years within the Soviet Union culminating in the deep purges of the late 1930’s and the devastating results of the first year of the war, resulted in many of these Officers being promoted quickly into positions that they were not prepared properly for.

Helion’s publishing quality is excellent and the translation by Britton of top quality. The writing style of the Russian historians is quite different from Western authors but does not detract from the content. An interesting book worth the time.