Tuesday, 17 January 2017
Author: Siegfried Westphal
Publisher: Lightening Source
General der Kavallerie Siegfried Westphal served in the German Army from 1917 until 1945. During that time he was employed in line and staff positions at a variety of levels; specifically Chief of Staff at Divisional, Corps and Army Group level. Following the successful conclusion of the Second World War, the Allied forces under Col SLA Marshall undertook a program of drawing upon German senior officers to draft treatise on their areas of expertise for future generations. Westphal, focused his efforts on the training and professional progression of staff officers within the German General Staff Officer development program.
The book is a reproduction of the original document prepared by Westphal, therefore, while the duplication value is satisfactory, it is not of the highest quality. Nevertheless, the information imparted by Westphal on the German program is of the highest value to both military and civilian agencies. He has divided his report into four distinct parts: The Selection and Education of General Staff Officers in Peace and War, the Organization, Work and Inner Life of the General Staff, the General Staff in WW2 and Basic Problems of the General Staff. Each of these sections is subdivided into areas of detailed study that provide an in-depth analysis based on his personal experience and professional evaluation of these broader headings.
His analysis is insightful and forthright. The recency of his practical experience under high intensity combat operations lends credence to his observations. He emphasizes the necessity to adjust aspects of the training and development of these officers to meet the realities of operations but he identifies key areas which must remain untouched. Additionally, he highlights those aspects of the training that were deficient and had a real time negative effect upon the effectiveness of German combat operations; specifically, he is referring to the logistics and support elements of planning and execution.
This treatise is not long but it is extremely useful in learning from an expert whose has experienced the good and bad of the German General Staff Officer program. That the Germans were well ahead of their counterparts at the time in the development and training of their staff experts is well documented and acknowledged; Westphal’s work provides additional depth and breadth regarding the strengths and weaknesses of this noteworthy organization.
Tuesday, 3 January 2017
This review was published in the Canadian Naval Review
Rems provides excellent maps and photographs that serve to reinforce his narrative. Despite the areas of his work that could have been given greater appreciation (the Japanese operational and tactical demands and the logistics of the Allied effort) his writing is strong, his analysis balanced and his style engaging. It is easy to understand, although, unless actually experienced not fully appreciate, the horrible conditions under which these operations took place: determined, unforgiving adversaries, geography that was easily some of the most difficult in the world to operate within and generally ignored in the domestic and world press. A solid bibliography rounds out Rems' work. It serves as a fitting testament to those fighting in a horrific sideline and the challenges that they faced.
Title: South Pacific Cauldron
Author: Alan Rems
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
The public's knowledge of the Pacific Campaign during World War 2 is very limited and focussed. Battles such as Pearl Harbour, Bataan, Singapore, Midway and Iwo Jima come quickly to mind when challenged, but in actual fact, these represent but a few of the myriad of battles fought in the shadows of the European conflict and the Battle of the Atlantic. Rems' intent with this book has been to shed light, in one comprehensive work, upon those battles fought with no less violence, intensity and anguish in some of the most difficult environments on earth, that have faded from the collective conscience of the world writ large.
Further marginalizing the history of this conflict was he fact that the South Pacific Campaign served as both a prelude and to secure the southern flank of the much higher profile Central Pacific Offensive launched in late 1943. Maintaining a perspective that incorporates all of the major combatants (US, Japanese, Australian and New Zealand) he has ensured a balanced and studied approach to the successes and failures of the parties involved and thus an excellent study of lessons for the present.
Commencing with the Battle of Guadalcanal, the author focuses his attention on the operations in the South Pacific chain of island (Primarily the Solomon Islands, New Britain and New Guinea). It is very enlightening and surprising how effective and aggressive the Japanese remained despite an inexorable turning of the tide both in terms of resources and technology. For example, of the twelve naval battles of the Solomon Island campaign, the Japanese won or drew even in ten of them. Noteworthy technological advantages remained with the Japanese in terms of torpedo and torpedo bomber well into 1944; additionally, superior tactical control of surface assets in combat also remained with the Japanese commanders until the beginning of 1944.
The author undertakes a detailed analysis of the various combatant forces and it is striking the patterns that emerge. For example, it is clear that on the Japanese side, intelligence was woefully inaccurate, repeatedly underestimating Allied forces and intentions. Also, the Japanese were superb jungle fighters able to take advantage of terrain to develop formidable defensive works. As soldiers and aircrew, they were extremely resilient, tough fighters consistently taking horrible casualties compared to the Allies. Additionally, they were often operating under conditions of extreme malnutrition bordering on starvation as well as rampant illness. Logistically, it was evident that the Japanese were operating under extremely adverse conditions and yet, somehow, were able to maintain operational capability despite the incredible shortages. Unfortunately, the author does not provide a great deal of insight into this aspect of the operations limiting his Japanese analysis to the actions of senior officers; this would have been very enlightening and helpful as a counterpoint to the Allied undertakings.
On the Allied side, his discussions are fascinating. One is struck very early on by the interservice and international rivalries within and between the Allied forces. Resistance to joint operational command was very ingrained and was the cause of a series of losses that could have been avoided. Additionally, the Allies had broken the Japanese codes and were therefore in a much better position to proactively engage. Allied soldiers were equally as tough as their counterparts and a healthy respect for both the climate and between the adversaries was a hallmark of journals and recollections. What was also very interesting, was, especially within the Australian forces, was the employment of Divisions in diametrically opposite environments. Thus the Australian 7th Division, famous for its stand at Tobruk in North Africa was transferred to New Guinea and had to learn from scratch how to become effective jungle fighters. Again, the logistics of the offensives are given scant attention by the author despite the fact that many of the operations were undertaken with the sole purpose of providing operating bases.
Also, in terms of straight numbers, it is easy to understand why these campaigns did not challenge for the limelight in domestic attention. The operations generally involved small numbers of troops when compared with European or even Central Pacific operations) and were long drawn out affairs. Geography and infrastructure ensured that these actions were not quick nor dramatic. The environment was as dangerous and unforgiving as the enemy and was under appreciated at the combatants extreme peril.
This review has been submitted to Military History Monthly Magazine.
Overall, a short but interesting read. The author finishes with photos and notes on the present day conditions of the different battlefields. Recommended for those interested in some of the more peripheral battlefields of WW1.
Title: The Horns of the Beast
Author: James Stejskal
Photos/ Maps: 64/9
Very few have heard of the Swakop River Campaign in South-West Africa (SWA). Undertaken by South African troops against the forces within the German colony, it was concluded by the Allies in July, 1915. Relatively speaking it was a minor campaign when compared to the European and Turkish conflicts or even, for that matter, the East African campaign in what is today Kenya and Tanzania. Nevertheless, it was important for a number of reasons: it resulted in South Africa being responsible for SWA, it isolated the German surface raiders operating in the Far East and it reduced the German presence overseas.
For the Allies, victory was a forgone conclusion as the German forces were heavily outnumbered and they could not rely upon indigenous forces due to heavy handed policies which had both subdued as well as alienated their relationships. Additionally, German tactics were flawed and poorly executed by their commanders. Psychologically, the German officers were defeated almost immediately and this negativity transferred itself to their responsible forces. Finally, the physical environment in the region was not conducive to guerrilla style warfare being dry and, for the most part, open.
The author has done a good job at analyzing the challenges faced by both adversaries. The South African’s, while heavily outnumbering the Germans, were hampered by poor logistical planning as well as a revolt amongst those Boers who felt that they should not be fighting on behalf of the British Empire. It would have been interesting to have had more information on the nature and extent of this revolt as it was very significant to the timely execution of their mission. The Germans also allowed themselves to be distracted by a confrontation with the Portuguese colony of Angola (with whom they were not even at war). While successful, it removed a significant number of badly needed forces for the period of the three months that these troops were engaged.