Thursday 24 July 2014

Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers - Paul Moorcraft

The information presented was written by Chris Buckham; however, it was published in The Australian Army Journal. Therefore, the material is reproduced here by the author with the permission of the Journal. If you would like to republish this information or refer to excerpts please contact the AAJ:  chloe.diggins@defence.gov.au. Website for the Journal is: http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/LWSC/Our-publications/Australian-Army-Journal

Title: Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers
Author: Paul Moorcraft
ISBN: 978-1-78159-153-6
Hardcover
Pages: 184
Photos/Maps: 48 B/W//4
Publisher: Pen and Sword Publishing 

            Dr Moorcraft has written a very enlightening book about a war that received, relatively speaking, little to no coverage in the West; nor has it been the subject of much post war attention. The conflict between the minority Tamils of northern Sri Lanka and the majority Sinhalese lasted twenty six years from 1983 until 2009. A mixture of asymmetric and conventional fighting, it was unique in that the funding for the rebels came primarily from the Tamil diaspora and that they were able to build a force that included structured and disciplined air, sea and land elements. It is also unique in that the Tamils had, for a majority of the time, the upper hand in the conflict, only to be utterly crushed by the Government after a final, incredibly violent, three year campaign known as Eelam War IV (between 2006-2009).  

            Moorcraft’s book provides in depth historical analysis of the causes and execution of the wars over the entire period of the conflict.  Particular attention is paid to the development and expansion of the war from both the Tamil and Government perspective. This is important because it provides context to the reader and goes a long way towards understanding the success of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and the struggles of the Government. Additionally, Moorcraft discusses the key international players and the impact of the international environment on the struggle; in this case, the main external influencer was India.  

            This is interesting as the traditional players, the United States, UK and Russia, had very little influence on the activities in Sri Lanka. While the Sinhalese government paid lip service to their suggestions, they knew very well that they had to pay attention to the suggestions of India, the local superpower. What Moorcraft does very well is to identify and analyze the impact that Indian intervention had on the ongoing conflict and the complexity of that relationship (with both sides). He also expands upon the convoluted role that the Indian peacekeeping force played in their efforts to influence the final outcome and the lessons learned by the Tamils (and the Indians) from that interaction.  

Additionally, the development of capacity at each doctrinal level (tactical, operational and strategic) for the two sides is investigated and outlined. This aspect is quite fascinating as the Tigers represented a unique non-traditional force that became more effective due to its flexibility and adaptability as well as being under the sole direction of an acknowledged military genius (their leader Prabhakaran).  The Sri Lanken forces, hamstrung by changing governments, a concerted effort to keep their own forces weak and a lack of cooperation between the elements, struggled until, they too were able to finally coordinate and focus their efforts in the final war of 2006-2009; ultimately achieving total victory. The Tigers, despite early and protracted successes, were unable and unwilling to transfer their military success into an effective negotiating and political settlement. Combined with a series of strategic blunders such as the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi and the use of ‘mafia’ style techniques to ensure funding from the diaspora, the Tigers managed to provide their adversaries common cause and to isolate themselves internationally. 

Moorcraft’s work provides many lessons for the professional military officer and amateur enthusiast alike. These include: 

a.       The challenges of conducting a combination of conventional and asymmetric warfare simultaneously;

b.      The strengths and weaknesses of domestic and autocratic government in conducting long term operations;

c.       The impact of the international community on outcomes (ie the 9/11 attack);

d.      Small unit conventional and special forces tactics; and

e.       The requirement to maintain vision and goal of operations and the critical necessity of understanding when to focus on political vice military methods. 

Overall, an excellent read; engaging and entertaining. The production quality of the book is very high and the text easy to read. Moorcraft has provided an in depth bibliography with copious footnotes. I thoroughly enjoyed this book and strongly recommend it to those looking to expand their knowledge of operations in the Far East.

Monday 21 July 2014

Bloody Red Tabs: General Officer Casualties of the Great War 1914-1918 - Frank Davies and Graham Maddocks


The information presented was written by Chris Buckham; however, it was published in War History Online Journal. Therefore, the material is reproduced here by the author with the permission of the journal. If you would like to republish this information or refer to excerpts please contact the Review Editor WHO, Mark Barnes (mark@warhistoryonline.com). Website for the Journal is: http://www.warhistoryonline.com
 
Title: Bloody Red Tabs: General Officer Casualties of the Great War
1914-1918
Author: Frank Davies and Graham Maddocks
ISBN: 978-1-783-46237-7
Softcover
Pages: 225
Illustrations: 24 B/W
Publisher: Pen and Sword Publishing

                Popular culture likes to paint the senior officers of the First World War as petrified fossils of an earlier style of warfare unable to adjust to modern fighting methods and strategies. Further, they are also identified as compensating for this shortfall through repetition of outdated techniques and a refusal to both acknowledge their own shortcomings and to make themselves aware of the impact of their decisions. This prevailing attitude was, the authors allege, the result of a society reeling from the devastating losses of the war and looking for culpability and UK governmental leadership in the form of Lloyd George’s memoirs placing very clear responsibility for the war’s conduct on the shoulders of senior military leadership.

                Davies and Maddocks have undertaken an effort to adjust this perception and bring it closer in line with reality. Their approach does not seek to refute the idea that there were shortcomings amongst some of the commanders; indeed they readily acknowledge that there were some examples of poor leadership. What they do seek to redress is the idea that General Officers lacked courage and that they were unaware of the conditions under which their men fought; in this I would suggest that they were, for the most part, successful.

                Drawing upon statistics of killed, wounded and captured General Officers by year; operational experience and explicit orders from senior HQ’s and government officials forbidding front line exposure for senior officers, they show that, as a group, casualties were very prevalent amongst senior staff. This is not an unbiased study; the authors are quite clear of the position that they hold right at the outset and they focus their efforts to prove their thesis. Their research is comprehensive and they provide a detailed synopsis of the fate of each senior officer casualties from the British and Imperial Armies.
 
                I enjoyed this book and found it enlightening and educational. The authors have gone a long way towards redressing a misconception that history, thus far, has done little to address.

Tuesday 15 July 2014

Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951-64 - Isabel Campbell

The information presented was written by Chris Buckham; however, it was published in Soldier Magazine. Therefore, the material is reproduced here by the author with the permission of the magazine. If you would like to republish this information or refer to excerpts please contact the Assistant Editor Soldier Magazine (rclark@soldiermagazine.co.uk). Website for the Magazine is: http://www.army.mod.uk/soldier-magazine/soldier-magazine.aspx



Title: Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951-64
Author: Isabel Campbell
Publisher: UBCPress
ISBN: 978-0-7748-2563-4
Pages: 253
Photos/Maps: 0/0
Rating: 4/5
 
Canada's role within the NATO system and its subsequent influence on the world stage, despite participation and success in two world wars far in excess of its relative size, has always been perceived as secondary to the traditional, larger players. Campbell's book is an outstanding study into how the Canadian Government took advantage of the opportunity, presented by the deployment of its land force's back to the European theatre, to proactively establish and exercise a uniquely Canadian foreign policy. Drawing upon copious primary sources, Campbell has shed light upon a fascinating aspect of the interface and challenges of not only civil/military relations within Canada, but also how the role of this Brigade fundamentally changed the paradigm of the Canadian Defence community. Superbly researched and written, this book stands as a testament to the impact that small forces, skillfully lead, can have on an international stage.

The Devil's Garden - Steven Zaloga


The information presented was written by Chris Buckham; however, it was published in Soldier Magazine. Therefore, the material is reproduced here by the author with the permission of the magazine. If you would like to republish this information or refer to excerpts please contact the Assistant Editor Soldier Magazine (rclark@soldiermagazine.co.uk). Website for the Magazine is: http://www.army.mod.uk/soldier-magazine/soldier-magazine.aspx
 
Title: The Devil's Garden
Author: Steven Zaloga
Publisher: Stackpole Books
ISBN: 978-0-8117-1228-6
Pages: 272
Photos/Maps:
Hardcover
Rating: 4.5/5
 
Books relating to the Normandy Invasion are very numerous but not so perspectives relating to specific German defensive preparations to counter said invasion. Zaloga's book traces the concept, development, challenges, successes and failures of the German planning for a landing at Omaha Beach where the Allies suffered the greatest casualties on the morning of D-Day. Well researched and written, this is an excellent 'layman's' start point for interest in how Rommel and the Germans struggled to make the most of the advantages that they enjoyed and overcome/minimize the deficiencies. Replete with hundreds of photographs and graphs, it is an outstanding reference and educational tool.