ISBN: 978-1-107-03512-6
Hardcover
Pages: 412
Illustrations: 21 B/W, 15 maps
Publisher: Cambridge University Press Publishing
Four themes resonate throughout Stahel's work on the German
thrust towards Moscow in October, 1941: 1. logistics: its challenges and
importance, 2. the failure of the German high command to accept the capability
limitations of their forces, 3. the extreme willingness of the Soviet soldiers
to sacrifice themselves, and 4. the equal determination and inner strength of
the German soldier to continue to drive forward despite dwindling supplies and
atrocious weather conditions. Each of these veins of discussion permeate the
narrative and serve to reinforce the desperation of the two antagonists.
Stahels work focuses on the Germans primarily and the successes
and difficulties with which they were meeting. In my experience, a vast
majority of works relating to the Second World War do not give a suitable level
of attention to the issue of logistics and home front morale. Stahel, while
remaining at the strategic perspective (with some minor forays down to the
operational) identifies almost exclusively with the elephant in the German
room: logistics. The narrative discusses in detail why it was that a command
structure so adept at waging war chose to ignore this vital aspect. It is a
fascinating glimpse into the human psyche and continues to be as relevant today
as it was in October, 1941.
Stahel does not dismiss the masterful way that the German's
undertook the operational execution of war; indeed, the very fact that they
were as successful against the Russians in their drive for Moscow is a
testament to this. However, Stahel does do a noteworthy job of shining a light
upon the achilles heal of their war effort: the strategic planning and
execution of operations. This book is unique in that it is not about the
success that the Germans experienced during October of 1941 but, more
accurately, about why they could not have won despite their successes. It is
clear from the text, backed up by solid research, that the Germans were not
defeated by the Russians but by themselves and their inability to recognize
what was within the realm of the possible. That they could defeat the Russian
military was not in doubt; that they could stay ahead of a collapsing logistics
system, overheated German public opinion, the worsening weather, and above all,
their own inability to acknowledge the realities of their situation definitely
was.
Cambridge has published a wonderful book, of the highest quality,
and a very welcome addition to any historians library. An extremely extensive
bibliography rounds out a work of exemplary worth. Logistics receives the most
talk and the least attention in any operation yet it is as much the key to
victory or defeat as the finest combat unit and, as Stahel has so eloquently
proven, is ignored at one's absolute peril.
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